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THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW. By Charles de Visscher. Translated from the French
by P. E. Corbett. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
Pp. xvi, 381. $5.00.
It is a great privilege to review Charles de Visscher's book which, by
all accounts, already ranks among the classics of international law. It is
not a systematic study. The learned author chose "the most fundamental
institutions" "to illustrate views calculated to vitalize the study of positive
international law by throwing new light upon it. . .

."

(p. 164).

This

approach covers Books III and IV, and the longest part of the work. To
this we may add the preliminary study (Book I) "of the political system
within which international relations have been conducted since the beginnings of the modern State." (p. xiii). Thus the anatomy, physiology and
pathology of the "heart" of international law have been the subject of a
masterly exposition.
The author has fulfilled his aim to "re-establish contact with the
realities of every kind." As he notes, "the vistas that it reveals assuredly
lack the intellectual elegance and the dialectical charm of the theories that
jealously insist on the autonomy of law. They have one merit: they open
upon life." (p. xiii).
This leads the author to reject the pure theory of law in so far as it
gives "a purely formal image of the legal order" and identifies the State
"with norms." For Professor de Visscher, "the State is a social reality
whose elements cannot be brought within the confines of so transcendental
a view." (p. 66). Kelsen himself "seems to have abandoned some of the
dogmatic rigidity of his earlier writings." (p. 65, n.22).
The author comes very near to unifying form and life, logic and reality;
in his own theory of law in general, and of international law in particular.
Although this reviewer is very reluctant to speak of de Visscher's own
theory as it is patent that he wants to escape "theorizing" as far as possible,
one still feels in the book a nostalgia of natural law doctrines which is
never-it is true-allowed to distort the significance of realities. Here we
beg to differ. We cannot agree that "the ultimate explanation of society
as of law is found beyond society, in individual consciences."
(p. 99).
Bergonism may be a good philosophy. It is outside the realm of the
science of law. The ethical element in law cannot be injected from the
outside, from above the social milieu. It is part and parcel of this social
milieu and reflects it. The morality of law cannot be different from the
morality of the society it regulates.
(321)
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Form and norm are given a transcendental value in the pure theory
of law. This transcendental value is given by de Visscher to morals. In
both cases we step outside legal science proper.
This explains why the theory of power, as evolved by the learned
author, is not very satisfactory. Power he opposes to law. But power is
never defined. Sometimes it appears to be pure force, sometimes social
pressure, sometimes political, military, economic or even spiritual power,
and sometimes competence or jurisdiction. Sometimes it stands for the
men in power or the organs of the State or the State itself. "Power,
like love," Professor Jessup has reminded us, "is 'a many splendored
thing.' "1
It seems to us that what is called "General Relations of Power and
Law" (Book II), is in fact a survey of the relations between the social
milieu and law. As such it is highly educational. The author brings in his
wide experience as a negotiator, a judge and a scholar.
Thus, a consideration of the social milieu as it is "prevents us especially from assimilating resort to force in the present regime of self-help
to the legal sanction, monopoly of power in the internal order." (p. 72).
Noting that here power means the State, one cannot but agree with this
view. As Professor de Visscher explains, self-help is not simply the consequence of a lower degree of centralization in international society. It
cannot be described as a legal sanction as long as it is not used with "the
impersonal character of constraint in the service of law." (p. 72). It is
true that in the internal order legal sanctions may be used to pursue personal aims. But a machinery for redress exists. And such an abuse
(detournement depouvoir) is exceptional.
The effects of what the author describes as "hegemonial tensions"
(p. 82) are bluntly analyzed:
"Any lasting antagonism produces a measure of similarity in the
opponents. .

.

. Methods become similar: the psychological war

preached by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles answers the Soviet
Government's propaganda of subversion. .

.

. [T]he United States

of America's patronage of 'European Communities' is the reply to the
establishment of the satellite States." (pp. 83-84).
As a European writing a review for an American audience, I deem it necessary to underline such an analysis that comes from one whose moderation
and objectivity cannot be challenged. It explains, in part, the misapprehensions felt in many quarters. Lucidly the author does not deny that
"some hegemonial tensions, while changing political structures, may facilitate transition from the traditional juxtaposition of sovereignties to the
confederate or federal organization and thus make possible in the legal
domain the progress that may be expected from a reduction of national
exclusivism." (p. 86).
1. Jxssup, TLANSNATIONAL

LAW 12

(1956).
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The explanation of the "veto" in the Security Council is entirely devoid
of wishful thinking:
"The permanent members' right of veto was the sine qua non of
the Charter. It might be said that the principle was inscribed in international reality even before it was sanctioned by a text. Criticism
errs when it treats the veto as the decisive factor in the paralysis that
has overtaken the Security Council. With or without the veto, no
decision of real political importance, and especially no measure of
coercion, could have been taken either directly against a great Power
or even, in the present divided condition of the world, against a State
protected by a great Power. In all this the veto is only an instrument; the real cause lies in the state of basic political relations among
the great Powers." (pp. 109-10).
These few examples give a fair idea of the richness of the work. The
development of international law is put in its proper prospective in little
more than sixty pages (pp. 3-67) that no student of international relations
or law should omit to read. We might, perhaps, like the author to reexamine his opinion of Hobbes. We do not agree that "Hobbes' idea can
lead only to the denial of international law." (p. 15). In fact, we find
many common points in the observations of Hobbes and those of de
Visscher.
More than two-thirds of the book deals with positive international
law, ". . . the law which is effectively applied in the relations of States
by reason of the obligatory character that they recognize in it." (p. 133).
Every rule, to retain its full force of application must satisfy a double requirement: (1) it must correspond to social needs, and (2) the accuracy
of its formal expression must compare with the practice of States.
Perhaps we find a trace of natural law doctrines in the criticism offered
of the "double function" theory developed by Professor Georges Scelle.
(p. 137). "Whatever importance may be attributed to power, effectiveness,
the accomplished fact, and, in a word, to force in the existing process of
developing of international law," comments Professor de Visscher, "the
jurist cannot agree to regard the activities cited, where particular and contingent political interests play so large a part, as the performance of constitutional functions." (p. 138). This leads us astray from a realistic
interpretation of international law. First of all, "power" as exercised is
never "pure" force, it integrates military, economic, political, and also moral
elements. Secondly, not all activities make law, but only those satisfying
the double requirement mentioned.
Rightly, the State is still given "a key position" in the international
order. (Book III, c. II). The creation and disappearance of States is
examined. "Recognizing the appearance on a territory of a political entity
showing the characteristics generally attributed to the State, it [the international legal order] merely invests it with personality in the law of nations
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and requires it to fulfill the international duties that corresponds to its
authority." (p. 166).
Professor de Visscher rejects "a current but inexact terminology" that
(p. 170). We may mention our own rerefers to state "succession."
marks on O'Connel's well documented work in the Journal de Droit International.2 We also underline the importance of the application of the
principle of the continuity of law or the legal order in such a case.
Two sections deal with Man and Territory in positive international
law. The chapter ends with an examination of the status of international
organization, the reserved domain and the so-called European integration
agreements. (pp. 219-27).
Inter-State Relations is the title of Chapter III. It deals first with
international recognition. The nature of the recognition of States and
governments is aptly and realistically described:
"In practice the recognition of a State has two aspects: objectively
it takes note of the State's existence as a subject of international law;
subjectively, it implies that the conditions under which the State established itself are not contrary to the rights or interests of the recognizing
State. It is in this second aspect that recognition has political significance and is subject to the unfettered discretion of the government
granting it. This explains, on the one hand, why the existence of a new
State, with all the associated legal effects, is not affected by the refusal
of one or more States to recognize it, and, on the other hand, the
special value for a new State of recognition granted by States that have
been most interested in contesting its establishment." (p. 228).
The following sections examine the Respect Due to ForeignSovereignty
(Immunities of the foreign State, extraterritorial effect of its public acts,
attempts on its safety), the International Treaty (a special mention should
be made of the remarks on constitutional limitations (p. 248) and the
political element in interpretation) (p. 249), Diplomatic Protection and
International Responsibility, Recourse to Force.
The pessimistic outlook in the chapter on Peaceful Change is well
grounded. Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was a dead
letter. As to the new provision in the United Nations Charter, article 14,
there is a small chance that it will be more effective. (p. 324).
Finally in his examination of the judicial settlement of disputes (Book
IV), Professor de Visscher concentrates in relatively few pages his experience as a member of the International Court of Justice and Arbitration
Tribunals.
The teacher appears in the conclusion. The study of international
law cannot be separated from the study of the social sciences. But what
is needed above all is personal contact between teacher and student, the
reduction of "master courses." (p. 364). And "let us not forget that a
2. 83
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general culture, nourished with the teachings of history and philosophy, is
still the secret of that degree of intellectual detachment which, on the
borders of different disciplines, perceives their limits and presages their
convergences." Professor de Visscher has fulfilled these three aims. Even
personal contact can be established through the printed word.
Roger Pinto t

EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: The American Legal System.
By Carroll C. Moreland. Oceana Publications, Inc., New York,
1957. Pp. 128. $2.75. Copyright 1957.
Carroll C. Moreland, Biddle Librarian of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, has most laudably undertaken a challenging task in the
public interest in condensing into sixty-five pages (exclusive of appendices)
"This brief survey of our legal system . . . in the hope that it will give
the reader an understanding of its operation. . . ." because, as he states,
"Of all the phases of life in the United States, perhaps the one least clearly
understood is the administration of justice through the courts." The
material is drawn from 190 authorities listed in the Bibliography and many
other cited sources. It must be recognized that in such a brief work the
author of necessity has had to limit himself. Therefore, the usefulness of
the volume is enhanced by the lists of selected readings appearing at the
end of every chapter. David F. Maxwell, Immediate Past President of
the American Bar Association, in his Introduction, and Dean Jefferson B.
Fordham of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, in his Epilogue,
give emphasis to the author's objectives. This reviewer, in his twenty
years' experience in American citizenship education, has found that general
public ignorance of and the resultant apathy toward this basic phase of
"the separation of powers" in our Government is a national danger since the
successful operation of our Republic depends upon an informed electorate.
Our independent judiciary is a precious basic asset which needs constant
participation and attention from all citizens, laymen as well as judges and
lawyers. Until our people learn at least as much about it as they comprehend of the executive and legislative branches, our system of judicial
administration will not improve as it should.
Starting with a history of the origin of our courts in colonial days and
their development into our present dual federal and state systems under
the Federal and state Constitutions respectively, down to and including the
minor judiciary, the author outlines their jurisdictions, organizations and
procedures in both the civil and criminal fields. Useful charts of the
federal courts and of the Pennsylvania court system and their jurisdictions
t Professeur i la Facult de Droit de 1' Universit6 de Paris.
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are added. The operation of the jury system is explained and its continuance is urgently recommended.
Under the caption "Constitutional Guaranties," the author places
them in three categories: civil liberties, personal rights and civil rights, and
traces their development and application. Obviously, this involved extensive study. The main subjects are succinctly and lucidly explained, particularly the application of the fourteenth amendment under the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Brown v. Board of
Many subjects on which the public
Educ.1 and Shelley v. Kraemer.2
generally is vague or actually misinformed are extremely well explained,
notably the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof in criminal
trials. Trial procedures, including paragraphs on rules of evidence with
particular attention to hearsay and circumstantial evidence, are most informative. In referring to article II, section 9 of the Constitution pertaining to the writ of habeas corpus, the author recognizes that the so-called
Bill of Rights is not exclusive; that many other rights are stated in the
original Constitution as well as in the amendments subsequent to the tenth
amendment. There are appended a listing of the Virginia Declaration
of Rights (adopted June 12, 1776), the Federal Bill of Rights (proclaimed
December 15, 1791), and the personal rights and liberties specifically provided for in state and federal bills of rights, a searching comparison of
the several states' adaptation of the Bill of Rights.
In the chapter entitled "Manning the Legal System," the author dwells
upon the function of the lawyer, his preparation in law school and the
requirements for admission to the bar, the important role of the organized
bar, and the selection and qualification of judges. Inclusion in the Appendix of the Codes of Judicial and Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association should prove of particular significance to the reader.
Under the caption "Justice For All," appropriate credit is given to the
vital part played by legal aid societies, lawyers' referral plans, neighborhood
law offices, public defenders and court-assigned lawyers.
The reviewer is disappointed to find that the important subjects of
contracts and property rights, which constitute the basis of our whole
economic system, are conspicuous by their absence. The sanctity of
contracts is embodied in article I, section 10 of the Constitution: "No
State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the obligation of contracts. .
. " The sole reference to property rights, aside from the treatment of Shelley v. Kraemer, is the phrase from the fifth amendment:
. ..nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." Unfortunately, the earlier clause in the same amendment
'"
. no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law," and the like provision in the fourteenth amendment are
omitted. Considerations of space should not be permitted to stand in the
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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way of giving adequate coverage to this important class of rights, at
least to the same extent to which other rights are explained. It would not
have been amiss, in the treatment of civil rights, to state their origin-our
Creator-and to point out that government is merely their protector.
The potential areas of usefulness for this work are vast. Its employment is recommended for secondary schools and colleges, for all bar associtation citizenship committees, attorneys engaged in court visitation
programs for school students, adult education programs of chambers of
commerce and labor unions. Finally, our State Department might see that
it has its proper place in American libraries in foreign countries.
Robert V. Bolgert

ARCHEION OR, A DISCOURSE UPON THE HIGH COURTS
OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND. By William Lambarde. Edited
by Charles H. McIlwain and Paul L. Ward. Ames Foundation.
Harvard University Press, 1957. Pp. ix, 176. $5.00.
An ancient maxim tells us that a contemporary exposition has greatest
weight in understanding a legal rule, and this saying is even more applicable to the understanding of legal history generally. Much interest,
therefore, attaches to William Lambarde's description of the English
courts at the end of the sixteenth century. Lambarde was an antiquary of
note, author of one of the earliest county histories, and editor of an early
collection of the Anglo-Saxon laws. He was also a lawyer who not only
knew the courts of common law but had as well some familiarity with the
Court of Chancery. His description of these central courts, written as it
was in a critical period in the development of the English constitution, has
a significance which should not escape the attention of legal and constitutional historians.
The seventeenth-century conflicts between what may be termed executive justice and the rule of law-between the prerogative courts on the one
hand and the common-law courts on the other-has tended to obscure the
important sixteenth-century contributions of the prerogative courts. Those
courts, as Trevelyan reminds us, introduced new legal principles and enforced respect for the law by thwarting the intimidation of judges and
juries by local mobs and local magnates. Viewed from the standpoint of
abuses under the Stuarts, the Star Chamber is generally pictured as the
epitome of arbitrary justice; and yet, in the sixteenth century, for example,
that court afforded effective remedies to copyholders who lost their lands
as a result of the inclosure movement. So easy is it to read back into history
the convictions of a later day that contemporary views, when available, are
a necessity. Thus, Lambarde's "Confutation of some Objections against
t Judge, Orphans' Court of Philadelphia.
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the Star-chamber" (pp. 175-81) has special value, for he had had access
to its records and was familiar with its proceedings. Again, from the
standpoint of the clash that was soon to come between Chancery and the
courts of common law, his exposition of the merits of equity as administered in the Court of Chancery (pp. 58-77) has special significance. Although Lambarde's descriptions of many of the courts are meagre or
fragmentary, they are interspersed with such discourses as the "Conflicts
betweene the Law absolute and ordinarie," "The Office of the King," and
"The true moderation of Iurisdiction absolute" (pp. 108-32), which no
student of legal or political thought should overlook. Lambarde's history
is often wrong, as when he describes King's Bench and Parliament as
existing before the Conquest; his etymologies, for one who knew both
Greek and Latin, are often far-fetched or impossible. These short-comings,
however, must not be allowed to obscure the value of those portions of the
Archeion which describe the courts and their functions as Lambarde knew
them.
Lambarde wrote and revised his manuscript in the dosing years of the
sixteenth century, but the book was not printed until 1635, when an unrevised version was published by Daniel Frere. Thereafter, and in the same
year, an "author's" version was published by Lambarde's grandson because
of the "crying errors" in the earlier and unauthorized edition. The second
edition is the text reprinted and annotated by Professors McIlwain and
Ward. The latter, a former student of Professor McIlwain, has undertaken
in an extensive Appendix to deal with the difficult problems of textual
accuracy, and his reconstruction is careful and painstaking. Professor
McIlwain has supplied a short Introduction explaining the importance of
a new edition of the 1635 work. Although all readers will undoubtedly
regret that this master of English constitutional history did not expand the
Introduction into an extended essay on political thought in the Tudor
age, it must be said in his defense that such an essay would have overshadowed, if not eclipsed, the text of Lambarde.
George L. Haskinst
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.

